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BOOK REVIEW
DECISION To PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE
ANTITRUST DIvIsION. By Suzanne Weaver. Cambridge, Mass. and

London, England: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Press, 1977, Pp. viii, 196. $14.95.
Reviewed by C. Paul Rogers III*
Professor Suzanne Weaver's first book, Decision To Prosecute:

Organizationand Public Policy in the Antitrust Division, is a study
of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, its institutional behavior and its mechanisms for public policy formation.
Although Professor Weaver's audience is not limited to the legal
community, Decision To Prosecute will stimulate in two ways the
interest of antitrust students, scholars, and practitioners. On one
level, the reader will learn something about the internal operations
of the Antitrust Division, and may reconsider his preformed judgments about that influential, trenchant branch of the Justice Department. The reader's expectations of the book may well, however,
rise to a second level, because in studying the shaping of public

policy in the Antitrust Division Professor Weaver confronts some of
the broader, more important issues of antitrust enforcement as well.
For example, what real impact does the division have in maintaining competition in the American economy and in regulating the
conduct of big business? How effective is the division in forming and
carrying out policy decisions which eliminate anticompetitive
conduct?
Professor Weaver analyzes the operations and behavior of the
Antitrust Division by focusing on the manner in which it exercises
its considerable discretion in prosecuting antitrust violations., Al*Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago. Member of the Pennsylvania
Bar. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1973, University of Texas; LL.M. 1977, Columbia University.
1. The specific question she seeks to answer is: why does the division choose to bring a
particular case? S. WEAVER, DECISION To PROSECUTE 6 (1977). See also Arnold, Antitrust Law
Enforcement, Past and Future,7 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 5 (1940); Comegys, Quo Vadis: Case

Selection By the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, 46 ANTrrRUST L.J. 563
(1977); Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 365 (1970).
For attempts to explain the antitrust selection process in economic terms, see Asch, The
Determinantsand Effects of Antitrust Activity, 18 J.L. & ECON. 575 (1975); Long, Schramm
& Tollison, The Economic Determinants of Antitrust Activity, 16 J.L. & ECoN. 351 (1973);
Siegfried, The Determinants of Antitrust Activity, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 559 (1975). See generally
T. CALVANI & J. SIEGFRIED, ECONOMic ANALYSIS AND ANTITRust LAw (1979). Two interesting

studies of resource allocation in antitrust enforcement are Weiss, An Analysis of the Allocation of Antitrust Division Resources, and Mann & Meehan, Policy Planning for Antitrust
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though recognizing that the division employs many other types of
discretion in its day to day operation,2 the author justifies limiting
her inquiry to prosecutorial discretion because the division views
itself as an essentially prosecutorial unit, and this self-image
"pervasively affects the way it performs its other functions." 3
The author's observations and conclusions were based on some
one hundred interviews of division attorneys (both staff and front
office), private antitrust lawyers, Office of Management and Budget
officials, congressional staff members, and journalists knowledgeable about the division, which she conducted from 1971 to 1974.4 The
study was limited by two division-imposed restrictions. The division
prohibited discussion of cases by name, and the author was not
allowed to see written internal communications.5 Neither limitation, however, appears to have hindered greatly the author's ability
to gather data upon which meaningful analysis could proceed.
Of initial importance is the finding, repeated throughout the
book, that the division operates by what is termed the
"prosecutorial ethos." That is, the whole office, from the staff attorneys through the decision-making hierarchy of division prosecutors
to the Assistant Attorney General, is almost wholly motivated by
the desire to prosecute antitrust cases. This is not surprising, since
one would expect an office of lawyers entrusted with the duty to
enforce the antitrust laws to be so inclined. More surprising is the
author's finding that individual staff attorneys have little conception of the overall beneficial economic policy they should seek to
attain in a particular prosecution. Their view of antitrust goals,
Professor Weaver concludes, is incomplete and imprecise.6
The so-called prosecutorial ethos explains largely the division's
lack of concern for the policy implications of each decision to prosecute. Its staff considers itself a team of professional prosecutors who
bring cases based on information and investigation. They, and to a
large extent the division as a whole, are preoccupied with winning
cases in an adversarial setting. Accordingly, they believe that sound
legal arguments and evidence, not statements of economic or social
Activities: Present Status and Future Prospects, both in Ti ANTITRausT DILEMMA (3. Dalton
& S. Levin eds. 1974) (Federal Trade Commission study).
2. For a description of division discretion in deciding whether to bring a civil action or
seek a criminal indictment, see Baker, To Indict or Not To Indict: ProsecutorialDiscretion
in ShermanAct Enforcement, 63 CoRNELu L. REv. 405 (1978), and THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-

SION

ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND ITS IMPACT, AN

ASSESSMENT 110 (1967).
3. S. WEAVER, supra note 1, at 7.

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 45-46.
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policy, are needed for a successful prosecution, and that arguments
based on competitive policy will not sway judges concerned with
concrete proof of wrongdoing.
Professor Weaver's conclusions about the almost imperceptible
impact of the reigning Assistant Attorney General's policy declarations on his prosecutorial staff may answer various critics who believe that the division should be more policy conscious.7 Obviously
each Assistant Attorney General (AAG) has in mind the directions
in which he wants antitrust enforcement to advance. Practically,
however, an AAG cannot effect his prosecutorial policy when his
prosecutors are concerned almost solely with the legal merit of a
given case and the concomitant probability of success in a courtroom.'
Professor Weaver finds that AAG policy pronouncements providing substantive ammunition for prosecuting cases are well received and are implemented by the AAG's staff. Because many such
guidelines for prosecution, such as structuring cases around the
issue of injury to potential competition or of unhealthy aggregate
concentration in an industry, present practical problems of proof
and are likely to be greeted with reluctance by the staff,' however,
the author concludes that the prosecutors' attitudes toward policy
formulations by their superiors must be viewed in the prosecutorial
context, tempered by the necessity to win in court. 0
Other factors illustrate the division's lack of general policy
direction. Professor Weaver brings out one important point that is
generally overlooked by the division's critics-the informational
constraints working upon the office. The division receives or gathers
little information that is useful in a prosecution." Consequently, the
7. See, e.g., Kramer, CriminalProsecutionfor Violations of the Sherman Act:In Search
of a Policy, 48 GEO. L.J. 530 (1960); Posner, A Programfor the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 500 (1971). Cf. Buxbaum, Public Participationin the Enforcement of the Antitrust
Laws, 59 CALF. L. REV. 1113 (1971).
8. S. WEAVER, supra note 1, at 112.
9. Id. at 127. Perhaps a more current example of these pragmatic concerns is the shared
monopoly case that Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield has promised to bring. The
suit has yet to be filed largely because of concerns of constructing viable legal theories which
will be successful in an adversary setting. See Wall St. Journal, Aug. 22, 1978, at 16, col. 4.
10. S. WEAVER, supra note 1, at 129.
11. Id. at 57-58. The informational resources of the division have traditionally been
quite irregular. An antitrust official has admitted elsewhere that the agency essentially operates "out of the mailbox." THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 119 (M. Green ed. 1972). The
division's information gathering resources have become more sophisticated, in that the division's Economic Policy Office has been compiling significant industry performance information and storing it in computer data banks. The division still, however, relies heavily on
external sources, including idle cocktail party conversation. Comegys, supra note 1, at 56465.
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rigors of the adversarial system in which the division must operate
mandate a case-by-case approach. This may explain why fifty-eight
of the sixty-nine cases filed by the division in 1977 were price-fixing
cases while only one asserted a Section Two violation." Furthermore, the lack of usable information may inherently circumscribe
the actual prosecutorial discretion of the division.
Similarly, the division's prosecutorial self-concept may limit
the reach of policy and its exercise of discretion. The staff views
itself as professional, not political, and strives to maintain its image
as the "cream" of the profession." As prosecutors, the staff believes
they should take their cases as given, based upon the evidence of
illegality at hand.1 They do not want to bring cases which might
embarrass them in court and harm their reputations. The eagerness
to prosecute is thus tempered by the reality of litigation. The institution of policy or "theory" cases faces the same constraints since
the criteria upon which the decision to prosecute rests remains legalistic.
According to Professor Weaver, however, these limitations do
not intimate that the division is unprogressive. The prosecutors
indeed attempt to expand the scope of antitrust law to new situations which are deemed anticompetitive, but such expansion is undertaken in practice only if the chain of command is convinced that
the legal argument is sound and is supported by sufficient evidence
for ultimate success.15
Perhaps one of the most telling parts of Decision To Prosecute
chronicles the division's response to an AAG who attempted systematic policy direction. As an example, Professor Weaver considers the
regime of former Assistant Attorney General Donald Turner. Apparently, Turner sought to insure that the division was more cognizant
of the economic importance of its decisions. 6 He established new
decisionmaking structures and promulgated written guides "to constrain the lawyers' decisions and to limit the effects of those decisions."". Furthermore, he intervened personally and extensively in
One critic of the division's performance in detecting antitrust violations has suggested
that the paucity of field offices is a major drawback to effective enforcement. R. BoRK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOx 406 (1978). Professor Bork suggests creating more field offices by dispersing personnel now in Washington. Id. About two-thirds of the division's attorneys are normally based in Washington. S. WEAVER, supra note 1, at 4.
12. [Current Binder] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 858, at A-12 to A-13
(Apr. 6, 1978).
13. S. WEAVER, supra note 1, at 168.
14. Id. at 167.
15. Id. at 68.
16. Id. at 131.
17. Id.
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the review process."
Professor Weaver points to some staff resentment because of
the additional bureaucratic red tape Turner's actions caused. She
concludes, however, that resentment came about primarily because
solid cases were turned down by the division hierarchy on economic
rather than legal grounds. As the prosecutors viewed it, the range
of cases available for prosecution was limited, as was their ability
to win any given case, since the Turner policy was to establish good
legal precedent rather than to win cases.' The result was a decline
in staff morale which was reversed only when the next AAG took
office.2 0
Professor Weaver states that an AAG has relatively substantial
power to direct the division's course of action, at least for the length
of his tenure, but intimates that the implementation of new policy
by the regular prosecutors may encounter obstacles. Professor
Weaver, however, leaves unanswered the more important question-whether the implementation of a systematic policy of antitrust enforcement based upon an established criterion, such as economic impact, promotes better enforcement of the law than the
traditional case-by-case approach.
Even assuming that a particular antitrust policy can be considered beneficial, the likelihood of its successful implementation is
doubtful, both because of pragmatic prosecutorial considerations
and because of the uncertain judicial reception awaiting any new
dogma. Moreover, if the prosecutorial staff is indeed nothing more
than a team of prosecutors, systematic policy direction would undermine the staff's valued autonomy and, given the evidentiary
concerns of prosecutors, create frustration and diminish incentive.
The benefits of the policy and the likelihood of success must, therefore, be measured against the possible reduction of prosecutorial
efficiency.
The foregoing discussion raises an even broader question. While
reading Professor Weaver's book one cannot help but consider
whether the Antitrust Division is effective in enforcing the antitrust
laws." The author never really gives us her opinion. Yet it is an
18. Id. at 132.
19. For a view supportive of the Turner regime and critical of the prosecutors' reaction
to the introduction of systematic policy direction, see R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN Eco-

NOMIC PERSPECTIVE 229-31 (1976).
20.

S. WEAvER, supra note 1, at 133.

21. The question of division enforcement effectiveness should not, of course, be divorced
from questions of remedy and penalty for antitrust violations. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT,
THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAw AND EcONOMICS, (1976); Renfrew, The Paper Label
Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590 (1977).
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important question because if one concludes that systematic policy
direction is not the answer, one questions next whether the case-bycase approach is any better. To answer the question conceptually
one must formulate value judgments about the amount of influence
the division should have on the business economy. That issue, while
engaging, is beyond the scope of Professor Weaver's book. The question should be answered, however, in terms of whether the piecemeal approach provides the best use of the division's resources.2 1
Professor Weaver's findings provide substantial cause for reflecting about the division's performance. For example, annual
budgetary proposals of the division, are relatively modest. Former
AAGs have admitted that the division could not productively absorb more than a ten to fifteen percent annual budget increase.I
Self-induced budgetary restraint could indicate a lack of division initiative, aggressiveness, or even policy direction. Professor
Weaver finds that prosecution decisions are based on the legal merit
of each case rather than on the efficient use of antitrust resources
to maintain a competitive economy.24 Upon further reflection, however, the division's emphasis on winning in an adversary system,
coupled with the informational constraints imposed upon it, explain
why the division's budget seems to parallel closely its operating
needs. Arguably policy-directed division behavior would not be as
efficient, because ultimately the prosecutorial ethos would still control. Substantial expenditure of time and money on policy-oriented
directives may bear no fruit in court and may not ultimately result
in a more efficient use of the division's resources than the traditional
case-by-case approach.
Professor Weaver finds that division prosecutors are as eager to
expand their enforcement of the antitrust laws into uncharted areas
as are division administrators who make policy pronouncements.
Their enthusiasm is tempered by the practicalities of litigation, but
their lack of policy orientation beyond a general belief that competition must be preserved does not stifle their imagination.25 The division's emphasis on prosecution, however, may inhibit use of division
resources to confront the most economically significant matters,
particularly if the case is doubtful legally. 26 For example, the preponderance of price-fixing cases recently brought by the division is
not the optimal use of its resources; it rather reflects a prosecutorial
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

It is assumed that the greater the division's influence, the better.
S. WEAVER, supra note 1, at 140.
Id. at 61, 170.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 177.
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disposition to enforce the law.
Can the emphasis on prosecutorial values, which leads to piecemeal enforcement, be justified if one believes greater emphasis on
antitrust policy is needed to utilize maximally the division's
resources? Here Professor Weaver makes a telling point by reminding us that the legislative mandate for the Antitrust Division is
directed equally to enforcement of the antitrust laws and to the
realization of the principal antitrust policy objective-the protection of a competitive economy.Y Certainly then a balance should be
struck, and formulations of policy must be prepared to give way to
some extent to pragmatic enforcement considerations. The key to
maximizing the division's resources and influence in the competitive marketplace will depend largely on how the balance is struck.,
Too much policy orientation may stagnate the division prosecutors
and may ultimately be counterproductive. Specific policy objectives, however, are necessary to the division's assertion of influence
over troublesome economic and industry practices that do not fall
within traditional antitrust doctrine. Policy innovations are an obvious way for the division to influence the application of antitrust
principles to objectionable business behavior in an economically
beneficial manner.
Professor Weaver's book gives the antitrust reader plenty of
grist for his mill. The factual data for analysis are vast, and the
author's analysis is sound, but it does not go far enough. Undoubtedly this is largely because the work is a public policy behavioral
study, not a qualitative inquiry into antitrust enforcement by the
Antitrust Division. This reviewer, however, believes that the author's findings support more sweeping conclusions than those
made.2 ' The antitrust lawyer, student, or scholar will still thirst for
answers to the "big" issues, but the book is nonetheless valuable to
antitrust scholarship because it provides empirical foundations
upon which the answers to these issues may be formulated. In sum,
27. Id.
28. Thus it would seem that division resources should not be diverted from prosecuting
garden variety price-fixing cases, because the prosecution mandate in such cases is paramount. Policy directives, however, such as the division's current plan to bring a shared
monopoly case, should be given significant priority at the expense of conducting other investigations or instituting other difficult cases.
29. Professor Weaver contrasts usefully the unique features of the Antitrust Division
with those of regulatory agencies generally, and suggests that the performance and unique
characteristics of the division should be emulated. See generally Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HArV. L. REV. 547
(1979). This reviewer's interest in the book lies in other directions but does not serve to
diminish the value of the work.
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this is an important, well-conceived book which should not be
ignored by those concerned with the enforcement of the antitrust
laws."
30. Professor Weaver's work is not directed primarily to the legal community but to all
involved in the process of regulating business. The irritating, nonlegal manner of placing
footnotes at the end of the book rather than at the bottom of each page documents this.

